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Abstract 
Analogy has been shown to be important in many key cognitive abilities, including learning, problem 
solving, creativity and language change. For cognitive models of analogy, the fundamental 
computational question is how its inherent complexity (its NP-hardness) is solved by the human 
cognitive system. Indeed, different models of analogical processing can be categorized by the 
simplification strategies they adopt to make this computational problem more tractable.  In this paper, I 
deconstruct several of these models in terms of the simplification-strategies they use; a deconstruction 
that provides some interesting perspectives on the relative differences between them. Later, I consider 
whether any of these computational simplifications reflect the actual strategies used by people and 
sketch a new cognitive model that tries to present a closer fit to the psychological evidence. 
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1. Introduction 
The late Steve Jobs’ was very fond of a computer-bicycle analogy in which he 
recounted a Scientific American article about the relative energy expenditure of 
different animals in travelling a kilometre. The article reported that people lagged a 
long way behind the graceful condor and most other species when walking and 
running but that a person on a bike beat every other animal hands down (or feet 
down). Jobs’ analogy proposed that the computer was a bicycle for the mind, 
conveying lots of rich analogical ideas about mental effort, innovation and radical 
change.  
 After three decades of research (Gentner, 1980, 1983; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 
1983; Keane, 1982, 1988), analogy has moved from being viewed as an interesting, 
but specific, type of creative problem solving to being viewed as a central process in 
many core cognitive abilities; including relational reasoning, learning, categorisation, 
induction, and language evolution (Deutscher, 2005; French, 2002; Gentner & 
Forbus, 2011; Eysenck & Keane, 2010; Keane, 2010; Markman & Gentner, 2001). 
The corpus of experimental findings on these uses of analogy is supported by a 
menagerie of models that endeavour to explain the computational basis for analogical 
processing. All of these models have to solve one core computational problem; 
namely, that analogical mapping is very computationally expensive, provably NP-
Hard, potentially incurring processing ‘to the end of time’ on reasonably-sized, 
analogy problems (Falkenhainer, Forbus & Gentner, 1989; Veale & Keane, 1997; see 
section 2). As such, these models try to simplify various representational and/or 
processing aspects of the mapping problem – what we will call simplification 
strategies – to make analogising computationally tractable (see section 3). Indeed, an 
interesting perspective on analogy models can be gained by classifying them in terms 
of the simplification strategies they adopt (see section 4). Of course, the $64M 
question is whether any of these simplification strategies are those used by people 
(section 5).  In section 6, I sketch a new cognitive model – called GIBSON -- that 
processes analogies in a very computationally light fashion, one that perhaps more 
closely parallels the behaviour we observe in people. 
Deconstructing	  Analogy	   	   Keane	  
3	  
2. Computational Level of Analogy & Sources of Complexity 
Marr (1982) proposed that cognitive abilities should be characterized at three distinct 
but interacting theoretical levels; the computational, algorithmic and hardware levels 
that respectively capture (i) what needs to be computed, (ii) how the computation is 
achieved, and (iii) the neurological substrate in which this computation is carried out. 
The computational level does not talk about how the computation is performed, it just 
sketches those things that need to be computed to, for example, solve the problem of 
analogical mapping (with some minimal representational assumptions). A 
computational level account of analogy is useful because it allows us to rise above the 
algorithmic diversity of different specific models (Costello & Keane, 2000; Keane , 
Ledgeway & Duff, 1994). It is also useful for highlighting the complexity issues that 
any algorithmic model must solve. 
2.1 The Computational Level in Analogical Mapping 
At the computational level, analogy can be cast as a mapping between two knowledge 
representations (usually, called the base and target domains) that finds certain one-to-
one correspondences between parts of these descriptions (so-called matches). These 
matches can be between concepts of different representational types; for example, 
object~object matches, attribute~attribute matches or relation~relation matches. 
Gentner’s (1980, 1983) structure-mapping theory posited that there are two guiding 
principles in the computation of this isomorphism: parallel connectivity and 
systematicity. Parallel connectivity proposes that matches between relations will 
enforce matches between the things those relations connect; specifically, if the 
propositions love(jim, mary) and love(flo, bibi) are being matched then the love~love 
match will ensure that jim~flo and mary~bibi are also matched. Systematicity in 
analogical mapping refers to the preference for systematic sets of connected matches 
over isolated unconnected matches; in part, because they often support inferences by 
analogy (i.e., parts of the base domain not present in the target). Finally, making a 
strong representational distinction between attributes [hot(x), easy(y), red(z)] and 
relations [walk(x, y), run(y, z), touch(mike, mary)], structure mapping also proposes 
that analogy is more concerned with relation~relation matches than 
attribute~attribute matches. 
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 So, the Jobs’ computer-bicycle analogy might create correspondences between 
people using bicycles and people using computers, between people travelling physical 
distances by bicycle to far-away physical places and people travelling mental 
distances with a computer to a new conceptual places and, and so on.  We see parallel 
connectivity in this analogy when we use the matched relations (like use~use and 
travel~travel) to enforce object matches between person~person, bike~computer, 
physical-place~mental-place. We see systematicity at work when people prefer 
matches that are causally-connected to the travel predicates in the analogy. The 
relative importance of relational matches over attribute matches can arguably be seen 
in our tendency not to expect that the computer should be red or black like the 
bicycle.  
2.2 Sources of Complexity in Analogical Mapping  
Implicit in the above account are several other what-needs-to-be-computed details 
that help us elaborate this computational level account, signaling the inherent 
complexity of the problem; namely, the formation of matching parts and the 
determination of some overall interpretation for the analogy. On match formation, in 
finding a set of correspondences between the two domains, a space of putative 
matches (or match hypotheses) needs to be computed; for instance, in the computer-
bicycle analogy, we probably need to have formed many possible object matches and 
other relation matches (e.g., bike~person, person~computer, use~travel, travel~use, 
physical-place~person and so on) before one can determine the key matches of the 
final analogical interpretation. In finding the overall interpretation, one arguably may 
need to compute two further spaces, a space of partial mappings (p-maps) and a space 
of large-scale, global mappings (g-maps, each of which would be alternative 
interpretations of the analogy). The p-map space is a space consisting of small 
bundles of connected matches – or partial mappings (p-maps) – that can be used to 
build the overall analogical interpretation (generally, sanctioned by parallel 
connectivity); for instance, in the computer-bicycle case, we might have a number of 
p-maps for the lower-level relational matches, one p-map might contain [use~use, 
person~person, bicycle~computer] and another p-map would be [travel~travel, 
person~person, bicycle~computer], recognizing that there many be other p-maps that 
are inconsistent with these ones (like [use~travel, person~person, bicycle~computer], 
[travel~use, person~person, bicycle~computer]). Finally, as any two domains may 
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have several overall interpretations for the analogy, we may also need to compute a 
global-mapping or g-map space from which the best interpretation will be chosen: for 
instance, a g-map that puts the isomorphically-consistent use~use-p-map and 
travel~travel-p-map together would be one possible global interpretation of the 
computer-bicycle analogy. Of course, as we shall see, depending on one’s 
computational approach (symbolic or connectionist) it may well be possible to avoid 
elaborating all of these data-structure spaces, though most models do have distinct 
match, p-map and g-maps spaces. 
  The sources of computational complexity in analogical mapping have long been 
shown to arise in computing these different spaces (see Falkenhainer et al., 1989, for 
full analysis). First, finding all possible matches between two representations is 
generally cast as O(n2) on the n of the domain elements, as all the elements of the 
base domain can be matched with all the elements of the target. Second, in an optimal 
algorithm, to find the best g-map it is necessary to progressively merge all possible 
consistent p-maps, a step that may well also iterate over previously merged p-maps.  
Finding g-maps in this way is hugely computationally intensive, with a worse case of 
O(n!) on the n of the p-maps found.  It is these sources of complexity that lead to the 
provably NP-hard-ness of analogical mapping (Veale & Keane, 1997; Wareham, 
Evans & van Rooij, 2011), thus presenting several algorithmic challenges for 
cognitive models of analogy. As we shall see in the next section, various cognitive 
models adopt simplification strategies to solve these computational problems by 
either pruning the items in one or all of these spaces or prioritizing those items for 
consideration. The deeper question, of course, is whether any of the current cognitive 
models beat the computational problem in the same way that people beat it?  
3. Simplification Strategies in Analogy Models 
At the computational level, we have seen the inherent computational complexity in 
analogical mapping has to be resolved by the algorithms of the various cognitive 
models. Indeed, it is possible to classify the models in the literature in terms of the 
strategy they use to simplify the computational problem faced.  In an ideal world, we 
might have a model -- let’s call its MAGIC – that would immediately reduce the 
match space to just those matches that were in the best g-map (possibly, even 
skipping over p-map construction). Unfortunately, such magical simplifications have 
yet to be discovered.  In their stead, we have a number of different simplification 
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strategies that prune or prioritize the items in one or more of the three spaces: 
• Reduce Matches:  Obviously, reducing the match space is one important way to 
simplify analogical comparison. By pruning the match space, the overall ambiguity 
in the comparison may be reduced (e.g., one-to-many matches), as might the 
prolixity of subsequent structures built from these matches (i.e., p-maps, g-maps). 
Match reduction can be done in a number of ways: (i) representational restriction: 
uses typing in the representation to limit the match space (e.g., only objects can 
match objects, only predicates of the same –arity can be matched, unsupported 
attribute-attribute matches may be excluded); (ii) parallel connectivity restriction: 
uses predicate matches to constrain the space of object (or other) matches, so only 
objects (i.e., arguments to a predicate) that are placed in correspondence by 
predicate matches are generated, rather than generating all possible object-object 
matches between both domains [e.g., matching kill(fido, fiffy) and kill(joe, mary) 
will match up fido~joe and fiffy~mary; so, matches like fido~mary and fiffy~joe 
will never be produced if not supported by another predicate match]; (iii) similarity 
restriction:  finally, the match space can be reduced by similarity, where the most 
extreme, commonly-used strategy is to only allow matches between identical 
predicates, so that gradations of similarity between the predicates are not admitted 
(like kill will only match kill and never match wound, murder, harm or rub-out).  
• Prioritize Matches: aside from reducing the match space, one may also prioritize 
some matches over others for consideration in subsequent processing. That is, a 
metric can be applied to the set of matches (e.g., its –arity, frequency, higher-
order-ness) and then matches can be ranked in terms of this metric, so that some 
matches are chosen over others to be the focus of processing. By ‘prioritization’ 
we mean that there is an explicit computation of a gradient using the metric across 
the matches in the space; so, for example, a random strategy that just selects a 
match without scoring matches, would not meet this definition of prioritization. 
• Reduce P-maps: Matches are combined to form p-maps that, obviously, rapidly 
increase in numbers, if there is a lot of ambiguity in the match set. P-maps are 
bundles of matches that are immediately delivered by the parallel connectivity 
constraint1; found by starting at a root match and progressing down through a 
                                                
1	  Note, sometimes a single predicate match along with its supported object-argument matches will be a 
single p-map though in most cases p-maps will be somewhat larger (cf. Falkenhainer et al., 1989).	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hierarchy of matches to terminal object-matches. Obviously, if the p-map space 
can be reduced, in some way, then subsequent processing of g-maps will be eased.  
However, p-map space reduction is not an option typically used in many models 
(perhaps because it is hard to assess what to leave in or out at this stage).   
• Prioritize P-maps. More commonly, some prioritization of p-maps is used whereby 
a metric is applied to assess their “goodness” (e.g., the number of matches they 
contain or a systematicity score) and they are rank ordered using this metric to be 
selected for subsequent processing into g-maps.  Again, prioritization assumes 
computing a metric over the space of p-maps. 
• Prioritize G-maps: Just as p-maps can be prioritized, so too g-maps can be 
prioritized using some metric (e.g., size, systematicity scores)2. While optimal 
algorithms, like the original SME algorithm, considered all possible mergings of p-
maps to generate a set of alternative g-maps to find the best, more heuristic models 
often rank-order the p-map set (on some metric) and then merge a subset of these 
p-maps to find the best g-map. 
As we shall see different cognitive models deploy different simpification strategies to 
deal with the inherent complexity in analogical processing. 
Table 1: Simplification Strategies Used in Seven Cognitive Models of Analogy 
Model	   Reduce  
Match	  
Prioritize  
Match	  
Reduce 	  
P-map	  
Prioritize 	  
P-map	  
Prioritize	  
G-map	  
SME	   ✔	   ✔	   -­‐	   ✔	   ✔	  
IAM	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   -­‐	  
SAPPER	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   -­‐	  
CAB	   ✔	   ✔	   -­‐	   ✔	   -­‐	  
FARGs	   -­‐	   ✔	   -­‐	   ✔	   ✔	  
ARP	   -­‐	   ✔ -­‐	   ✔ -­‐	  
Gibson	   ✔	   ✔	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
                                                
2	  Note, in theory, the line between p-maps and g-maps can be somewhat grey; most g-maps are 
mergings of several p-maps but, in principle, a single p-map could be a g-map if it was the only and 
largest bundle of matches in a comparison. 
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4. Classifying Models by Simplification Strategy 
Initially, six models are reviewed by classifying them in terms of the simplification 
strategies they adopt to perform analogical mapping (see Table 1).  The models divide 
strongly along symbolic-connectionist lines that often treat representations quite 
differently. It is interesting to see how different simplification strategies are realized 
in different model architectures and the classification sheds some light on the options 
that exist to realize plausible and parsimonious cognitive models (a point I return to in 
section 5 after this review). 
4.1 Structure-Mapping Engine (SME)  
SME, the original rendition of the Structure-Mapping Theory (Gentner, 1983), was 
really the first, well-specified, cognitive model of analogy. Combining the different 
versions of the SME (Falkenhainer et al, 1989; Forbus, Ferguson & Gentner, 1994; 
Forbus & Oblinger, 1990) into its most cognitively-plausible greedy-merge version, it 
is clear that SME uses a combination of representational match-reduction, p-map 
prioritization and some g-map prioritization.  Optimal SME has a worst case O(n!) 
complexity on the number of p-maps, though its heuristic greedy-merge version does 
somewhat better, O(nlog(n)). 
 Match reduction in SME: Taking two domains that are explicitly typed as 
relations, attributes, and objects SME reduces the match space by only allowing 
matches to be formed between elements of the same type. SME will also only match 
objects that that have been sanctioned as the arguments of matched predicates. As 
such, the explicit structure of the representation plays a key role in the program’s 
success at finding analogical correspondences, leading to criticisms that the 
representations are “hand-tailored” (Chalmers, French & Hofstadter, 1992; Forbus et 
al., 1998; Morrison & Dietrich, 1995). SME also enforces a strong similarity 
constraint on matching, only allowing identical predicate matching3. This further 
limits the match space in that the program does not have to consider all the possible 
gradations of similarity that may exist between non-identical predicate matches.  
                                                
3	  SME can also run with a free-for-all rule-set that allows any predicate of the same -arity to match, 
though obviously this increases complexity. SMErs have also done some work on re-representation to 
overcome some of the strictness of the identicality constraint (Kurtz, 2005) but, arguably, these 
methods involve quite conservative representational changes. 
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 Match prioritization in SME: Technically, SME could also be said to use 
match prioritization, in the sense that it scores each match (e.g., object matches get 
lesser scores than relational matches). However, it does not use this metric to directly 
select one match over another but rather uses it to score the systematicity of larger 
bundles of these matches.  
 P-map Prioritization in SME: From this reduced match set, SME builds p-
maps out of hierarchically-connected sets of matches; so if the proposition 
cause(love(M, T), kill(M, T)) matches cause(love(A,B), kill(A, B)) then these five 
matches will be grouped as a p-map (n.b., the smallest p-map is a single-predicate 
match and its object-argument matches). Each of these p-maps is scored for its 
structural goodness which reflects the number of matches it contains and the 
connectivity of those matches (Structural Evaluation Score or SES). This metric then 
allows SME to prioritize the best/largest p-maps for merging purposes, to find the 
best, global mapping for the analogy.  
 G-map prioritization in SME: As p-maps are merged they become candidate 
g-maps that are, in turn, may be prioritized by their structural scores. So, in SME’s 
greedy-merge method it takes the highest-scoring p-map and then successively 
attempts to merge other p-maps with it (if they are consistent with it), rank ordering 
these p-maps by their scores. In this way, it heuristically finds the best g-map; but it 
will also find alternative g-maps using the SES scores. So, in one sense, SME 
prioritizes g-maps during construction of alternative interpretations for the analogy. 
 Comment: So, overall SME succeeds by a clever mix of major restrictions on 
the initial match space followed by a gentler prioritization of interesting regions of the 
p-map and g-map spaces to move towards the best (g-map) interpretation of the 
analogy. As we shall see, many of these simplification strategies are re-used in the 
other models that followed SME. 
4.2 Incremental Analogy Machine (IAM)  
IAM (Keane & Brayshaw, 1988; Keane et al., 1994; Keane, 1997) developed an 
incremental model of analogising to find a plausible explanation for the ease with 
which people map analogies. Essentially, Keane and colleagues suggested people 
worked heuristically from the largest connected structure in the base domain, found 
matches for it and then folded in other matches to it incrementally based on the order 
in which match-elements appeared in the domains. Using rather simple mapping 
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puzzles, Keane et al. showed that their model paralleled the time-course of 
analogising in people, suggesting that order mattered for these types of mapping 
problem (see Keane, 1997). 
 IAM uses similar representational, match-reduction techniques to SME 
combined with a form of p-map prioritization to generate is single, best g-map 
(though it may backtrack to alternative g-maps if the first choice proves to be poor). 
As such, IAM does not really explicitly juggle alternative g-maps and, therefore, 
cannot be said to prioritize them in the same way as SME does. 
 Match reduction in IAM: Uses most of the same match-reduction techniques 
as SME, only matching elements of the same type, using predicate identicality, 
exploiting the argument-structure of predicates to form matches. In this way, it shows 
the same sensitivity to the structure of domains and is open to the same 
representational-criticisms as SME.   
 Match prioritization in IAM: Occurs in two ways, first in promoting the 
matching of elements in the largest, connected predicate-set in the base (effectively, 
leading to p-map reduction) and, second, by using the order in which matches occur 
in the domain representations as a metric for preferring some matches over others; so 
as the elements in the base are matched with those in the target they are stored in 
order and those at the front of this set are chosen first.  
 P-map reduction and prioritization in IAM: To the extent that IAM entertains 
p-maps it performs a simple reduction in the p-map space, by picking the largest p-
map. In actual fact, it could also be said that IAM prioritizes p-maps as the matches it 
prefers using order-of-occurrence are often minimal p-maps (i.e., a relational match 
and its matched arguments). 
 Comment: IAM’s simplification strategies have been shown to produce correct 
interpretations for many of the classic analogies; that is, most can be solved by 
heuristically picking the largest structure in the base and building a g-map from it.  
The impact of order-of-occurrence has been psychologically verified for some 
analogy problems, but whether it holds more widely is an open question (see Keane, 
1997). As such, IAM is quite a light and simple analogical model. 
4.3 SAPPER  
SAPPER (Veale, 1996; Veale & Keane, 1997) is a connectionist model that addresses 
the computational complexity of analogy by adopting a very different algorithmic 
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approach. It works in a localist, semantic memory of connected nodes with attribute 
and relational links, in which putative matches (match-bridges) are created between 
concepts when certain structural regularities hold in the domain representations.  
SAPPER uses two rules to build its set of match-bridges: (i) triangulation rule, which 
builds a match-bridge between two concepts if they share an identical predicate (e.g., 
the attribute red), completing the triangle of links and (ii) squaring rule, which builds 
a match-bridge forming the fourth side of a square of links (based, in part, on match-
bridges previously constructed by the traingulation rule), when three link-sides are 
found connecting four concepts in the two domains. When an analogy/metaphor is 
asserted – such as, “Surgeons are butchers” -- parallel activation is passed out along 
the links in both domains, passing over the match-bridges between the surgeon and 
butcher domains. When activation cycles settle the highest-activated (scored) matches 
are read off as the interpretation of the analogy (i.e., the best g-map). Although 
SAPPER’s connectionist architecture differs significantly from the symbolic approach 
of SME and IAM, it can still be understood as employing a mixture of 
representational match-reduction, as well as match and p-map prioritization 
techniques. 
 Match reduction in SAPPER: Though SAPPER’s knowledge representation is 
a localist semantic memory (its nodes still represent concepts and arcs various 
predicates) it is clear that SAPPER’s bridges are equivalent to the matches of other 
models. As such, SAPPER reduces the match space using representational typing and 
predicate identicality in its triangulation rule.  So, for example, certain match-bridges 
will never be created unless the objects involved share identical attributes.  In 
SAPPER runs, this appears to have a major impact on match reduction, where 
comparisons with about 200+ matches/p-maps in SME are reduced to problems with 
only 18 matches/p-maps in SAPPER. So, SAPPER  avoids a lot of the computational 
complexity through a combination of its parallel approach and its pruning of the 
match space. Unfortunately, one side effect of this solution, it that SAPPER could fall 
foul of the “hand-tailored” criticism; a close inspection of the domain descriptions 
shows that, perhaps unwittingly, some seem to contain pivotal attribute 
correspondences on which successful analogising may hinge.  
 Match prioritization in SAPPER: The match bridges built in SAPPER have 
‘richness’ scores associated with them to indicate their relative importance.  This 
score may reflect structural aspects (the connectivity of the concepts involved) and 
Deconstructing	  Analogy	   	   Keane	  
12	  
other variables. In this way SAPPER has a metric to prioritize one match over others, 
though this is really only cashed out when the program settles and the final activation 
levels of matches are read off as the best g-map. 
 P-map reduction and prioritization in SAPPER: As a knock on effect of math-
reduction, it can be said that SAPPER also reduces the p-map space, though it also 
employes a form of prioritization of p-maps. SAPPER uses very flat domain 
representations and as such many (though not all) of its p-maps are essentially cases 
where a single predicate match is the p-map (i.e., the p-map is just a predicate match 
and its object-match arguments).  As these p-map structures can be said to have a 
‘richness’ score, it is reasonable to say that SAPPER uses p-map prioritization.  
Though, unlike symbolic models, p-maps are not merged but are just the focus of 
iterative, activation propagation in the network; after which the highest scoring nodes 
are read off as the best, global mapping. 
 Comment: SAPPER advances a model that appears to be very computationally 
efficient in forming analogies.  Extensive tests on a large corpus of domains shows 
that it can find interesting and fruitful analogical correspondences, even when domain 
boundaries are not explicitly shown. Perhaps its greatest issue is which aspect of the 
model is responsible for its success; is it successful because of its representations or 
its match-pruning techniques or its spreading activiation methods.  
4.4 Connectionist Analogy Builder (CAB)  
CAB (Larkey & Love, 2003) report another connectionist implementation that uses 
constraint satisfaction in a localist, semantic network (Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams, 
1986).  It uses predicate identicality to establish match links between the nodes of the 
two domains and then uses a coding of the directionality of link-paths between nodes 
to implement parallel connectivity and systematicity.   On the face of it, it appears to 
be a fairly-straight parallel rendition of SME’s constraints, with some additional 
parameters that allow for the modelling of working memory limitations. CAB uses the 
same representational match-reduction techniques as SME and then uses its iterative 
constraint-satisfaction methods to prioritize matches to generate a single, best g-map. 
As CAB uses structural constraints from p-maps, in one sense, it could be said to 
prioritize them to find the best analogy interpretation; but, this is a moot point given 
the parallel nature of the model. 
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 Match reduction in CAB: Uses most of the same match-reduction techniques 
as SME, only matching elements of the same type, using predicate identicality, 
exploiting the argument-structure of predicates to form matches. In this way, it shows 
the same sensitivity to the structure of domains and is open to the same 
representational-criticisms as SME. 
 Match and p-map prioritization in CAB: Occurs by promoting the matches in 
the larger p-maps over others, to be selected as part of the g-map.  
 Comment.  CAB is another interesting architectural twist on the SME-story.  
Like SAPPER it appears to compute analogies quite efficiently, though its complexity 
is quite sensitive to the structure of the domain. 
4.5 Fluid Analogies (FARG)  
The analogy models developed by the Fluid Analogies Research Group (FARG; 
Hofstadter & FARG, 1995) represent an important and novel departure from the 
previous models, primarily because they have much more representational flexibility 
than the others.  In these models, the domain representations are built at the same time 
as the analogy is being mapped (hence, the high-level perception debate between 
them and SMErs; Chalmers et al, 1992; Morrison & Dietrich, 1995).  For example, in 
the Copycat model, which developed analogies for letter sequences – how should one 
complete abb? by analogy given lmmnnn – one could propose abbc or abbccc as 
completions by analogy based on whether one categorises nnn as “next-letter-in-
alphabetic-sequence” or “next-letter-plus-one-more-than-previous-group”. FARG 
models entertain alternative descriptions of the elements in the domains while 
forming the analogy, rather than working off given, fixed-predicate descriptions. So, 
in one sense, these models expand the match space to represent alternative 
categorisations/representations of the objects involved and then explore these much 
richer representations, using parallel methods, to really “create” the analogical 
correspondences rather than finding them “ready-made” via an identicality criterion. 
 The complexity entailed by the FARG family of models is unclear as they 
have been largely applied in quite restricted domains (some would say “toy 
domains”).  What is clear, is that they require significant categorisation and solution-
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goodness knowledge to drive the analogy process4.  Clearly, there is no real match 
reduction (as it is often expanded), though there is prioritization of matches/p-maps/g-
maps as the model moves progressively to the global interpretation of the analogy. 
Exactly what type of structure is prioritized may be a matter of interpretation, given 
the parallel nature of the model.  
 Match prioritization in FARG: FARG models clearly prioritize some matches 
over others, in that a given match can have a different weight (goodness score) in the 
overall comparison being made (e.g., the “next-letter-in-alphabetic-sequence” 
mapping may be weighted lower than “next-letter-plus-one-more-than-previous” 
mapping because the latter covers more attributes of the elements).  
 P-map/G-map prioritization in FARG: While it is a matter of  interpretation 
exactly what is prioritized in these models as they iteratively add categorisations and 
mapping links between concept nodes, it is probably most reasonable to cast these as 
progressive g-maps, that are successively prioritized and refined by interactions 
between the added category information, the weights on mapping links, the 
competition between alternative mappings and the assessment of the overall goodness 
of the analogy. 
 Comment: FARG models represent a very significant departure for models of 
analogy, as they propose a much more dynamic perspective on the building of 
representations; the analogy emerges from a dialogue between the alternative possible 
categorisations of the elements of both domains and the global requirements of the 
comparison.   However, unlike many of the previous models, it is less clear what 
general principles can be applied to other cases of analogy; for instance, concretely 
how they might be applied to the benchmark analogies regularly discussed in the 
psychological literature? 
4.6 Analogical Relational Priming (ARP)  
The Analogical Relational Priming model (ARP; Leech, Mareschal & Cooper, 2008) 
is another connectionist model that uses distributed representations of predicate 
relations in a recurrent network, where the analogy gradually emerges as a by-product 
of pattern completion.  ARP concentrates on explaining the developmental 
phenomena found using simple, proportional analogies, such as apple:cut-apple:: 
                                                
4	  To such a degree that it is hard to imagine how they would operate in the sorts of domains used in the 
previous analogy models, without modeling significant parts of human knowledge.	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bread: cut-bread. The basic idea is that relations are encoded in memory as 
transformations of one state into another (e.g., an apple state to a cut-apple state) and 
when presented with a partial analogus domain, the tranformational state is projected 
onto the new object to generate the analogy (see Keane, Smyth & O’Sullivan, 2001, 
for a related approach to similarity). ARP is also demonstrated with one larger 
analogy – the WWII-Gulf War analogy – where it incrementally finds analogical 
matches, using a random-selection strategy.   
 So, like the FARG models, in one sense ARP expands the match space in 
using all the distributed representations associated with the relations and objects in 
both domains. When analogies get larger than proportional ones, it uses a random 
strategy to select matches incrementally. 
 Match prioritization in ARP: A random selection strategy is an interesting 
simplification strategy though it is doubtful whether it would work adequately in 
larger analogies (n.b., strictly speaking it is not prioritization).  However, Leech et al. 
do acknowledge that some sort of prioritization of matches might emerge from the 
top-down structure of domains,  though this idea remains to be cashed out.   
 Comment: In the Behaviour & Brain Sciences commentary on Leech et al’s 
paper, many criticisms are elaborated. For example, Holyoak & Hummel (2008) say it 
throws away all the essential aspects of analogising in handling larger analogies, 
others question how the model can find analogies between distant domains, where a 
shared basis for pattern completion would not exist (Dietrich, 2008; French, 2008). 
One would also worry about the adequacy of the representation of the base relations, 
in terms, of whether they reflect the true range and diversity of event instances for a 
given relation. 
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(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 1: Two analogy problems -- (A) Flow Analogy and (B) Atom Analogy – showing (i) 
the objects in the domains (blue circles), (ii) the predicates taking part in root matches 
(predicate names with boxed outlines), (iii) the BestMap initially found by Gibson (shaded 
areas in both domains), and (iv) the order in which BestMatches were selected for the 
mapping (numbered, dashed arrows). 
5. Direct Psychological Evidence for Simplification Strategies 
While cognitive models often assume many hypothetical representations and 
processes to explain the psychological evidence, it is noteworthy that there is little 
direct evidence for most of the simplification strategies used in analogy models.  For 
example, in their review of the benchmark psychological effects in the analogy 
literature, Markman & Gentner (2000) list three main phenomena: (i) that cognitive 
representations are structured and the comparison process operates to align two 
structures, (ii) analogical relatedness depends on semantic commonalities between 
relations in the two domains being compared (iii) the comparison process is driven by 
a search for correspondences that preserve connections between representational 
elements (see p. 501). Notably, all the models reviewed here meet these benchmarks, 
even though many use very different simplification strategies. So, which model best 
parallels what people actually do? 
 There are actually very few results in the literature that directly support a given 
simplification strategy.  For instance, there is little evidence to show that certain 
matches are never entertained during analogical comparisons, that the time course of 
analogizing is hindered by the presence of competing g-maps or that merging p-maps 
is eased by reduced ambiguity in the match space. To show that such tests are 
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possible consider a few instances.   Keane (1997) provided evidence on the time 
course of mapping using simple mapping problems, showing that order effects 
occurred in finding mappings; by moving the relative positions of elements in the 
domain descriptions. Larkey & Love (2003) report that working memory limitations 
affect particular cross-mapped analogies mapping adopted between two domains 
when interpretations based on attributes or relational structure are provided. Finally, 
O’Toole & Keane (2012) found some evidence that comparing objects using different 
similarity instructions (e.g., “Are these two objects similar?” versus “Are these two 
objects similar by virtue of their colour?”) affected subsequent visual search where an 
object had to be found in a camouflaged background; indicating that the matches 
stored from the similarity judgment were different in both cases. 
 When one considers the unresolved issues around representation, the 
complexity that still persists in handling large domains, and the lack of direct support 
for different simplification strategies (and thus inherent lack of parsimony in 
explanations), one wonders whether it might be worthwhile to develop a minimalist 
model that might do such things more directly. In the next section, we outline a new 
model that meets some of these constraints and report some initial results from it. 
Table 1: Gibson’s Performance on Two Analogies 
Measure	   Flow	   Atom	  
Total Matches 44 35 
No. of BestMaps 2 3 
BestMap produced 1st 1st 
BestMap Matches N 10 12 
Cycles to Optimal 2 3 
Runtime (secs) 0.037 0.039 
6. GIBSON: A Parsimonious Model of Analogy 
Earlier we said that a fictional best model of analogy – we called it MAGIC – would 
restrict the match set to just those matches that supplied the minimal set of p-maps 
that merged to deliver the best g-map.  This is what the GIBSON model tries to do 
(Keane, 2012a, 2012b). Like most previous models, GIBSON partially restricts the 
match space using representational typing (predicates only match predicates, object 
only match objects) but beyond that it can entertain all manner of matches (including, 
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in theory, alternative classifications of the objects it the domain5).  
 Essentially, GIBSON tries to jump from the matches directly to the subset of 
matches that make up the best interpretation of the analogy (i.e., the optimal g-map or 
BestMap); it tries to do this by using the information present in the matches alone 
(information that can be derived from the original, presented domain representations). 
In this way, it only constructs p-maps from selected matches when it is merging them 
with other p-maps to build this global g-map; so, it tries to jump from matches 
directly to the best interpretation, though when its heuristic guesses fail or a tie 
between matches is encountered, it can fork its processes to pursue alternative g-
maps. So, the GIBSON algorithm essentially prioritizes the match set using a variety 
of features of the matches generated; essentially, it tries to assess each match for its 
BestMap Potential, its potential for being one of the matches making up the optimal 
g-map. At present, in GIBSON, BestMap Potential is based on a formula applied to a 
match, M, between any base element, b, and any target element, t:  
(1)  BestMapPotential(b, t, M) = 
  |AM(b, t, M)| + Min(L(b), L(t)) + Freq(b) + Freq(t) 
  + R(b, t, M) +  |NN(b, t, M)| * |KN(b, t, M)|  
where it finds the sum of the size of the set of argument matches of the match (AM), 
the minimum of the levels (L) of both elements (i.e., where they are in the hierarchies 
of the domain), the frequency of the match’s elements (Freq) in their respective 
domains, the rooted-ness of the match (R) in their respective domains and, finally, the 
product of the sizes of the set of new matches (NM) added to known matches and the 
known matches (KM) in the g-map being built. GIBSON iteratively selects matches 
with highest score until either no matches are left to be checked or all the base 
elements have been mapped (see Keane, 2012a, for details).  
 Interestingly, this approach can be shown to generate the correct best 
mappings for the benchmark analogies in the literature in a very computationally light 
way (see Figure 1 and Table 1). It also may well be the first analogy model to 
demonstrably handle very large analogies (e.g., up to 91,000 matches) in reasonable 
time limits. Table 2 shows GIBSON runs on self-mapped domains (mapping a base 
domain to itself) from Veale’s (1996) professions domains and predicate descriptions 
of student essays. These runs also illustrate how more natural domains (the student 
                                                
5	  Though this feature is not yet implemented, in any way. 
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essays) seem to have very different structural properties to ones have have been 
assembled by researchers (the professions domains). 
Table 2: Gibson Median Runtimes and Size Statistics for Several Large Analogies  
Comparison Total 
Matches 
Partial 
Maps 
G-map 
Size 
%  
Corr 
Time 
(secs) 
  Literal Similar Rules  
Professions:      
Composer-Self 11,605 4,881 201 63 10 
General-Self    49,013 
 
29,629 
    407     62    223 
Essays:      
Design-Self 2,493 38   181   100 0.57 
Compress-Self 6,326 59   328   100 2.49 
  Free Forall Rules  
Professions:      
Composer-Self 20,885 14,161 201 44 26.6 
General-Self 91,145 71,824 407 55 628 
Essays:      
Design-Self 4,443 64 181 100 0.74 
Compress-Self 14,320 129 328 100 7.6 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have reviewed seven models of analogical mapping in terms of the 
simplification strategies they adopt. This taxonomic framework provides a handy way 
of appreciating some of the similarities and differences between the models.  It also 
points up the extent to which many key aspects of the models lack any direct 
evidential foundation in the empirical literature (a separate issue that perhaps needs to 
be addressed).  Lastly, we have introduced a new model of analogy, called GIBSON, 
that tries work more directly and efficiently and reports on some of its processing 
parameters. 
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